Moving beyond reconnaissance. Learn how logical gaps in the graph layer allow for unauthorized data access and how traditional API security models fail here.
GraphQL's power lies in its graph structure, but this interconnectedness is also its greatest weakness if not properly gated. The most prevalent issues usually stem from authorization logic being missed at the field level.
Broken Object Level Authorization. Accessing another user's data by simply changing an ID argument in a query, because the resolver checked authentication but not ownership.
The schema defines fields like `email` or `address` on the User type. The client doesn't request them, so the UI looks fine, but an attacker can query them directly.
Constructing deeply nested recursive queries (e.g., User -> Posts -> Comments -> User -> Posts...) to exhaust server CPU and memory.
Attackers don't just look for bugs; they look for Business Logic Flaws. In GraphQL, this means finding connections in the graph that shouldn't exist for a given user role.
"If I can't query `allUsers` directly because I'm not an admin, can I query `myProfile { organization { users { id, email } } }`? Often, the nested `users` resolver forgets to check if the parent requestor is an admin."
This is the core of GraphQL exploitation: finding indirect paths to sensitive data through legitimate relationships defined in the schema.
Enterprise applications often fall victim to these specific patterns:
Legacy security tools are built for REST. They inspect the URL path (e.g., blocking `/admin`).
In GraphQL, everything happens at `/graphql`. A traditional WAF sees a valid HTTP POST to a valid endpoint. It cannot parse the JSON body to see that the user is actually querying for `systemSettings { database_password }`. Security must move from the network layer to the application (resolver) layer.
Confidential documents for further study: